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This study examined the performance of 41 patients with focal prefrontal cortical lesions and 38 healthy controls on a task-switching 
procedure. Three different conditions were evaluated: single tasks without switches and two switching tasks with the currently relevant 
task signalled either 1500 ms (Long Cue) or 200 ms (Short Cue) before the stimulus. Patients with Superior Medial lesions showed both a 
general slowing of reaction time (RT) and a signiﬁ  cantly increased switch cost as measured by RT. No other prefrontal group showed this 
increased reaction time switch cost. Increased error rates in the switching conditions, on the other hand, were observed in patients with 
Inferior Medial lesions and, to a lesser extent, ones with Superior Medial lesions. Patients with left dorsolateral lesions (9/46v) showed 
slower learning of the task as indicated by a high error rate early on. Several different processes are involved in task-switching and these 
are selectively disrupted by lesions to speciﬁ  c areas of the frontal lobes.
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INTRODUCTION
Many tests used for assessing impairments of prefrontal function such 
as the Wisconsin Card-Sorting test (Milner, 1963; Stuss et al., 2000) and 
the Extra-Dimensional/Intra-Dimensional Shift task of the CANTAB bat-
tery (Owen et al., 1990) require the subject to switch from one ‘task-set’ 
or cognitive ‘schema’ to another. However, the extent to which the critical 
process of set-switching does in fact involve prefrontal cortex cannot be 
clearly determined from performance on these multi-component tests. 
In the mid-1990s, a paradigm was developed to allow switching from 
one cognitive schema to another to be examined in a purer form (Allport 
et al., 1994; see also Jersild, 1927; Meiran, 1996; Rogers and Monsell, 
1995; Spector and Biederman, 1976). In this switching paradigm the 
subject must switch repeatedly, typically between two tasks, each of 
which can be carried out on the same stimuli. In the most frequently 
used variant, switches occur on a ﬁ  xed schedule, e.g., the ‘alternat-
ing runs’ procedure developed by Rogers and Monsell (1995), wherein 
switches occur every two trials. This allows performance on so-called 
‘switch’ trials to be contrasted with the equally common ‘repeat’ trials. 
Alternatively, the relevant task on each trial can be determined by a cue 
occurring shortly before the stimulus, as in the task-cueing paradigm 
(Biederman, 1972; Meiran, 1996; Meiran and Daichman, 2005; Meiran 
et al., 2000).
These early studies led to the development of two contrasting hypoth-
eses which have continued to dominate the ﬁ  eld. In one, put forward by 
Rogers and Monsell (1995), switching between tasks requires a speciﬁ  c 
top-down process called ‘task-set reconﬁ  guration’, which can be meas-
ured by the so-called ‘Switch Cost’, namely the average reaction time on 
a switch trial minus that on a repeat trial. A different account is given by 
Allport et al. (1994) who hold that the longer reaction times on switch than 
on repeat trials derive from the processing necessary to inhibit the task-set 
active on the previous trial; in this case the switch cost does not directly 
reﬂ  ect the time that any particular operation takes (see also Gilbert and 
Shallice, 2002). More recently, Monsell (2003) has developed an interme-
diate position and differentiated three types of processes that affect task 
switching. First, following Allport et al. (1994) is ‘task-set inertia’, which 
has to be overcome. Second, is the equivalent of task-set reconﬁ  guration, 
which Monsell called ‘endogenous control’, where the controlling task-set 
is switched in a top-down manner. Third, following a clear demonstration 
of the potency of the process by Allport and Wylie (2000), is ‘exogenous 
task-set’ activation, where the activation is generated directly from asso-
ciations previously made with the speciﬁ  c stimuli (see also Waszak et al., 
2003). The second and third of these correspond to the two ways of acti-
vating schema in the model of Norman and Shallice (1986) – through top-
down activation from the supervisory attention system and by bottom-up 
triggering by incoming sensory information in contention scheduling.
Several neuropsychological studies have suggested that lesions of 
the left prefrontal cortex affect task-set switching (Aron et al., 2004; 
Keele and Rafal, 2000; Mecklinger et  al., 1999; Rogers et  al., 1998; 
Stablum et al., 1994). Rogers et al. (1998) studied six patients with left 
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frontal lesions and six with right frontal lesions. Only the patients with 
left frontal lesions showed larger switch costs than controls. However, 
these extra switch costs only occurred when the tasks were potentially 
interfering (or ‘incongruent’) – the two task-sets active in the same block 
requiring different responses to the same stimuli – and indeed a simi-
lar effect has recently been obtained in patients with cerebellar lesions 
(Schweizer et al., 2007). Mecklinger et al. (1999) found that patients with 
lesions involving the language-areas of the left hemisphere were the 
most affected, which could suggest the use of verbal mediation.
Functional imaging studies have shown activation of several different 
prefrontal regions during task-switching. Some studies have found that 
task-set switching involves left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Garavan 
et  al., 2002; MacDonald et  al., 2000; Ruge et  al., 2005). However, in 
other studies task-switching led to activation of right-hemisphere struc-
tures, in particular the right inferior frontal gyrus (Brass et al., 2003; Dove 
et al., 2000; Dreher and Berman, 2002; Sohn et al., 2000). Another study 
(Rushworth et al., 2002) has implicated medial prefrontal structures, in 
particular the pre-SMA. However in this study the task-switch merely 
involved responses being mapped onto other stimuli without any change in 
either the stimulus or the response set. This differs qualitatively from more 
standard task-switching experiments such as those of Rogers and Monsell 
(1995) wherein each task requires the subject to attend to a different 
dimension of the same stimulus (e.g., the number as opposed to the letter 
in a letter-number pair such as R5). Other studies have suggested a role for 
more anterior prefrontal structures such as BA 10 (e.g., Braver et al., 2003; 
DiGirolamo et al., 2001; Dreher et al., 2002; Ruge et al., 2005).
Neuropsychological studies can be easier to interpret than functional 
imaging ones since they provide error patterns, and one knows that an 
affected region is critical for task execution (Shallice, 2003). A recent such 
study, that of Aron et al. (2004), is particularly important as a large number 
(36) of patients with well localised frontal lesions were tested. A variant of 
the alternating runs paradigm, developed by Rogers and Monsell (1995), 
was employed. On each trial a cue immediately follows the response to 
the preceding stimulus and the stimulus then follows after a cue-stimulus 
interval which could either be short (100 ms) or long (1500 ms). Rogers 
and Monsell (1995) had shown that a longer preparation interval reduced 
but did not eliminate the switch cost. Aron et al., found that the left frontal 
patients had larger switch costs than controls for the short cue-stimulus 
intervals (cf. Rogers et al., 1998). At the Long Cue-stimulus interval, how-
ever, both right and left frontal subgroups had larger switch costs than 
the normal controls; the patients did not use the extra preparation time as 
effectively as control subjects. In contrast to Mecklinger et al. (1999), Aron 
et al. (2004) argued that the left middle frontal gyrus was critical for task-
switching – that the role of the left frontal cortex in task-set switching is in 
the selection and maintenance of a task-set or schema.
A more surprising result concerned the error rates. At the short 
response-stimulus intervals the right frontal patients made nearly three 
times the errors on the switch trials compared to normal controls. On the 
basis of a correlation analysis between size of lesion and switch costs 
they localised this effect to the right inferior frontal gyrus and in particular 
the pars opercularis (see also Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Aron et al., 2003; 
Chambers et al., 2006). However, while the primary deﬁ  cits for the right 
frontal group as a whole concerned errors, the analysis that Aron et al., 
used to correlate with lesion size and location involved reaction times, 
where for the critical short cue-stimulus intervals the right frontal group 
did not differ signiﬁ  cantly from controls. Moreover, the correlations con-
sidered important in the theoretical discussion of the results involved the 
‘residual switch cost’, that is the switch cost after the Long Cue-stimulus 
interval, while the critical right frontal error deﬁ  cits involved both cue-
stimulus intervals. There was no apparent localisation derivable from the 
error analysis pointing to the right pars opercularis.
The ﬁ  ndings of Aron et al. (2004) add greatly to our knowledge of 
the cognitive neuroscience of task-set switching. However, a number 
of issues need to be addressed. A major cause of the difﬁ  culties that 
subjects have in task-set switching is due to the co-activation of two 
different cognitive schemas over the course of a set of trials (Allport and 
Wylie, 2000). In a functional imaging experiment comparing blocks where 
switches can occur with single-task blocks, Braver et al. (2003) showed 
that tonic potentiation of two task schemas in a block leads to activa-
tion of right anterior prefrontal cortex, unlike the transient switch-related 
changes which were predominantly left lateral as far as the frontal cortex 
was concerned. The study of Aron et al. (2004), however, only included 
experimental blocks where both of the two tasks are potentially active. In 
addition, most of the anatomically critical ﬁ  ndings relate to the measure 
‘switch costs’, which is closely linked to one particular theory, namely 
that involving the task-set reconﬁ  guration of Rogers and Monsell (1995), 
and it is unlikely that switch-costs transparently reﬂ  ect the duration of 
any such process (see Gilbert and Shallice, 2002).
We therefore carried out a further study of task-set switching as 
part of a series of investigations of the involvement of different regions 
of prefrontal cortex in a variety of tasks loaded on attention-related 
processes. The speciﬁ   c experimental paradigm used cued task-
switching (cf. Meiran, 1996; Meiran et al., 2000). For each stimulus a 
warning signal speciﬁ  es which task is relevant and this occurs either 
1500 ms (Long Cue) or 200 ms (Short Cue) before the stimulus. In prin-
ciple, the hypothetical process often assumed to be critical for task-
switching – namely task-set reconﬁ  guration (Rogers and Monsell, 1995) 
or endogenous control (Monsell, 2003) – can take place prior to stimulus 
presentation in the Long Cue condition but not in the Short Cue condition. 
Moreover, the experimental paradigm also includes blocks where only a 
single task-set is relevant. These Single Task blocks provide a situation 
where there is no task conﬂ  ict, which is important given the imaging 
ﬁ  ndings of Braver et al. (2003). By contrast the Long Cue and Short Cue 
conditions are both situations where task conﬂ  ict occurs on so-called 
‘incongruent’ trials within a block. Such a conﬂ  ict has also been shown to 
be   neuropsychologically important in a task-switching study of patients 
with cerebellar lesions carried out by Schweizer et al. (2007).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
This study was an unselected case series, subject to inclusion-criteria 
based on baseline testing. Inclusion of different aetiologies was nec-
essary in order to obtain patients with lesions in all frontal regions as 
  different aetiologies have predispositions for different regions of frontal 
cortex (Stuss et al., 1995). The method is based on the premise that the 
location of lesions is more critical than the aetiology in determining cog-
nitive deﬁ  cits (Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Elsass and Hartelius, 1985; 
Stuss et al., 1994). Forty-one patients with focal lesions to the frontal 
lobes and 38 healthy control participants were participants in the study. 
The non-patient control group (CTL) was matched as closely as possible 
to the patients for age, sex, and education. All the patients were at least 
2 months post acute onset (mean = 22 months; range = 2–109 months). 
The other criteria for inclusion in the series were absence of severe 
aphasia, no clinically detectable neglect, no signiﬁ  cant neurological or 
psychiatric disorder other than that that produced the lesion and an IQ 
of at least 90 (Patients m = 106; Control m = 112). The aetiology of the 
lesions was an acquired acute disorder; these included infarction, haem-
orrhage (including ruptured aneurysms), trauma with no evidence of 
  diffuse axonal injury, or resection of a benign tumour with no detectable 
evidence of diffuse brain pathology.
Based on our previous research, patients were assigned to one of the 
following four groups: left lateral frontal (LL, n = 11); right lateral frontal 
(RL, n = 6); inferior medial (IM, n = 14); superior medial (some subjects 
in this group had an extension of the lesion into the inferior medial region; 
see Stuss et al., 1998 for rationale; SM, n = 10). Lesions in the patients 
in the two lateral groups could include lateral subcortical lesions involv-
ing deep frontal white matter and the dorsal caudate (see Stuss et al., 
1994 for rationale). In seven patients the lesion extended to non-frontal 
  structures. In six of these (4 RL, 2 SM) the non-frontal extension was less Prefrontal cortex and task-switching
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than 10% of the entire lesion (range = 3.3–8.1, mean = 6.1%). In one 
patient in the IM group, the non-frontal extension was 35%.
All the lesions were localized by the use of a standard template (Stuss 
et al., 2002a) which was based on the methods of Damasio and Damasio 
(1989). Lesion size was quantiﬁ  ed by superimposing the lesion contours for 
each axial slice onto a ﬁ  xed pixel diagram and then counting the number of 
pixels within the lesion area. The percentage of total brain area damaged 
was obtained by dividing the lesion count by the total pixel count for all 
axial slices. The lesions for the patients studied are shown in Figure 1. The 
ﬁ  gure shows only 39 patients since the scans of two IM patients had been 
available for lesion documentation but were lost prior to quantiﬁ  cation. The 
aetiology, location of lesion, time from the acute onset to that of testing, 
and handedness of the patients are presented in Table 1, derived from 
Table 2 of Alexander et al. (2005) which also includes two patients – 2195 
and 2206 – that could not be tested for this study. All subjects responded 
with their dominant hand. None had weakness or impaired motor control. 
All reported normal colour vision. Measures of neglect (line bisection, and 
double simultaneous stimulation) were normal in the patients. The National 
Adult Reading Test-Revised (NART-R) was administered to provide a meas-
ure of general intellectual ability. Other neuropsychological tests measures 
included Digit Span forward and backward, Token Test of language com-
prehension, Boston Naming Test, Judgment of Line Orientation, and Beck 
Depression Inventory (see Table 2 for group scores). Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants according to the declaration of Helsinki. The 
experiments were approved by both the Human Subjects’ Research Ethics 
Boards of Baycrest Centre and the University of Toronto.
Procedure
The subject was presented with a 6.7  cm  × 6.7 cm  square  window   
divided into four square panes (or quadrants) of internal size 3 cm × 3 cm. 
A red circle appeared in one of the four quadrants (see Figure 2). In the 
Upper/Lower (U/L) task the subject had to press button 1 (L) if the stimulus 
appeared in one of the upper quadrants and button 2 (R) if it appeared in 
one of the lower quadrants. In the Left/Right (L/R) task the subject had to 
press button 1 (L), if the red circle appeared in one of the left quadrants, 
and button 2 (R) if it appeared in one of the right quadrants. The buttons 
were pressed with the index ﬁ  nger of the dominant hand. If the stimulus 
appeared in the top left or bottom right positions then the same button had 
to be pressed whichever task was in operation; these trials were termed 
‘Congruent’. If the stimulus appeared in the top right or bottom left posi-
tions then the button that had to be pressed depended on which task was 
in operation; these trials were termed ‘Incongruent’ (see Figure 2).
There were three conditions, each involving separate blocks of trials. 
In the Single Task conditions the type of task (U/L for two blocks and L/R 
for two blocks), remained constant throughout the block of 26 trials. The 
stimuli within a block occurred in a pseudo-random order. Each stimulus 
was preceded by a task-cue 200 ms before the stimulus occurred. For 
the U/L task this was the words ‘Upper or Lower?’ appearing just below 
the grid in the centre of the screen; for the L/R task, the words were ‘Left 
or Right?’. The task cue and the stimulus remained on the screen until the 
subject made a response. There were then two conditions in which the 
two types of task occurred in a pseudorandom order in the same block of 
50 trials. In the Long Cue condition the task-cue occurred 1500 ms before 
the red circle stimulus appeared. In this condition, the participant could 
in theory prepare the task-set before the stimulus occurred. In the Short 
Cue condition, the task cue again occurred 200 ms before the stimulus. 
In this condition, the participant theoretically could not prepare the task-
set before the stimulus appeared. The task-cue signal itself occurred at 
an interval following the previous response which was randomly selected 
from a rectangular distribution with limits of 1200–1800 ms (Long Cue 
Condition) or 2700–3300 ms (Short Cue Condition). There was a practice 
block of 12 trials before the ﬁ  rst occurrence of a particular type of block. 
Overall there were two blocks of each of the two Single Task conditions 
and also of both the Long Cue and the Short Cue conditions. This allowed 
the effects of practice to be examined in each condition. The order of 
conditions was: Single U/L, Single L/R, Short Cue, Long Cue, Long Cue, 
Short Cue, Single L/R, Single U/L.
Statistical analyses
The measurements – mean reaction time and errors – were compared 
across the conditions and subject groups. Trials were excluded if the reac-
tion time of the subject exceeded 4 standard deviations of the mean RT in 
that condition of the subject’s group (cf. Stuss et al., 2005); in all 0.81% of 
trials were excluded. Two different complementary ANOVA designs were 
used. First, a split-plot ANOVA was used in which the performance of each 
of the four lesion groups is compared in turn to that of the CTL group. 
As this method of comparison was preplanned – indeed it is common to 
all the ROBBIA group of papers (e.g., Alexander et al., 2005; Stuss et al., 
2005) – the standard 0.05 alpha level was used for these comparisons 
(see Keppel, 1982; Stuss and Alexander, 2007). This is called the Basic 
Groups ANOVA. If there was a signiﬁ  cant difference for a particular group 
compared with controls, a second ANOVA was carried out to determine 
whether that patient group was signiﬁ   cantly different from the other 
patients combined. This is called the Within Lesion Groups ANOVA. The 
aim of this two-stage analysis procedure, referred to as two complemen-
tary ANOVAs, was ﬁ  rst to demonstrate the existence of an abnormality and 
then to assess whether it was speciﬁ  c to a particular lesion location.
In addition we performed a ﬁ  ner anatomical analysis (for justiﬁ  ca-
tion see Alexander et al., 2005; Stuss et al., 2005), using the anatomical 
classiﬁ  cation procedure of Petrides and Pandya (1999) (P & P). The logic 
is similar to that employed in Voxel-based Lesion-Symptom Mapping 
(VLSM) procedures (e.g., Bates et al., 2003, Rorden and Karnath, 2004) 
although the anatomical grain used is much coarser. For each P & P area 
in the frontal lobes, we identiﬁ  ed all the patients who had lesions in that 
area. Given there were at least three such patients, their performance 
on a behavioural measure (e.g., number correct) was compared using a 
Mann–Whitney test to that of all patients who had no damage to that area. 
As the aim was to provide more speciﬁ  c anatomical location sites for an 
effect established behaviourally in the previous basic groups analyses, this 
procedure was only carried out if a signiﬁ  cant effect of group had indeed 
been obtained in the basic groups analysis and Bonferroni   corrections 
Figure 1.  Lesion locations. The ﬁ  gure shows the lesion overlaps in the four 
patient groups (LL =  Left Lateral (11 patients); RL = Right Lateral (6 patients); 
SM = Superior Medial (10 patients); IM = Inferior Medial (14 patients)). Darker 
shading indicates a greater number of patients with lesions affecting the 
region. The scans for one patient in each of two groups (LL and IM) were 
unavailable for plotting.Shallice et al.
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Table 1.  Etiology, lesion location, lesion size, time since injury and handedness within patient groups.
Subject  Etiology   Lesion location*  Lesion size (%)**  TSI (months)   Handedness 
Left lateral    
2056 Benign  glioma  resection  Dorsolateral  0.6  24  Right
2137 Trauma  Ventrolateral  1.3  95  Right
2149 Trauma  Dorsolateral  0.2  7  Right
2152 Trauma  Dorsolateral  0.2  8  Right
2156 Hemorrhage  Caudate  1.1  6  Right
2174 Hemorrhage  Dorsolateral,  ventrolateral  2.0  24  Right
2177 Meningioma  resection  Dorsolateral,  ventrolateral  3.3  7  Right
2191 Infarction  Caudate  0.8  24  Right
2197 Trauma  Dorsolateral,  ventrolateral  1.3  2  Right
2208 Meningioma  resection  Dorsolateral  0.4  14  Right
2210  Meningioma resection   Dorsolateral, ventrolateral  0.8  22  Right
     1.1 21
Right lateral    
2154 Infarction  Ventrolateral  0.1  15  Right
2161 Meningioma  resection  Ventrolateral  0.4  6  Right
2181  Meningioma resection  Ventrolateral, corpus callosum, caudate  2.5  6  Right
2186 Meningioma  resection  Dorsolateral  2.7  5  Right
2188  Infarction  Ventrolateral, corpus callosum, caudate  2.6  19  Right
2202  Infarction   Dorsolateral, ventrolateral  3.9  30   Right 
     2.0 13
Inferior medial    
2047 Hemorrhage/SAH  Inferior  medial  (R)  0.4  4  Right
2053  Trauma  Polar (R), Inferior medial (R),  2.4  25  Right
    dorsolateral (L), ACG (R)
2134  Trauma  Polar (L & R), inferior medial (L & R)  3.9  91  Right
2140  Infarction/SAH  Inferior medial (L & R), ACG (L)  1.2  48  Right
2142  Trauma  Polar (L & R), ventolateral (R),  3.2  21  Right
    dorsolateral (R), inferior medial (L & R)
2143  Trauma  Polar (L & R), inferior medial (L & R),  3.7  27  Ambi
   ventrolateral  (R)
2146  Trauma  Polar (L & R), inferior medial (L & R),  4.6  48  Right
    ventrolateral (R), corpus callosum (L & R),
   caudate  (R)
2148  Trauma  Polar (L & R), inferior medial (L & R)  3.3  11  Ambi
2166  Meningioma resection  Polar (R), inferior medial (L & R)  0.6  6  Right
2169 Hemorrhage/SAH  Polar  (L)  *** 109  Right
2180  Infarction/SAH  Polar (R), inferior medial (R)  *** 28  Right
2196  Trauma  Polar (R), dorsolateral (R),  2.4  14  Right
    inferior medial (L & R)
2198  Hemorrhage  Inferior medial (L & R)  0.3  10  Right
2203  Trauma   Inferior medial (R)  1.0  12   Left 
     2.3 32
Superior medial    
2131  Trauma   Polar (L), superior medial (L)  1.7  52  Ambi
2135 Trauma  Superior  medial  (R)  0.6  6  Right
2151  Infarction  Corpus callosum (L & R), polar (R),  4.1  37  Right
    inferior medial (R), superior medial (R),
    dorsolateral (R), ventral lateral (R)
2153  Trauma  Ventrolateral (R), superior medial (R),  7.0  37  Right
   dorsolateral  (R)
2159  Hemorrhage  Corpus callosum (L & R),  4.2  31  Right
    superior medial (R), dorsolateral (R)
2185  Infarction  Polar (R), inferior medial (R),  11.0  6  Right
    ventrolateral (R), corpus collosum (R),
    superior medial (R)
2190  Meningioma resection  Corpus callosum (R), polar (R & L),  11.5  9  Ambi
    inferior medial (L), superior medial (R & L),
    dorsolateral (R & L)
ContinuedPrefrontal cortex and task-switching
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were not used. We considered all areas with a one-tailed p < 0.1 as 
potentially involved in the processes that determined the measurement, 
and areas with a one-tailed p < 0.05 as   deﬁ  nitely involved.
RESULTS
Reaction times
Single task condition. The most basic condition is the Single Task one, 
in which each task is presented independently for a complete block of 
trials. Two complementary ANOVAs with factors Task (U/L v L/R) and 
Group were carried out. Overall in the Basic Groups ANOVA, the horizon-
tal decision was faster than the vertical one (F(1,74) = 15.0, p < 0.001). 
Only the SM group was slower than both the CTL group (F(1,74) = 7.30, 
p = 0.009) (in the Basic Groups ANOVA) and the Other Patient groups 
(F(1,39) = 8.04, p = 0.007) (in the Within Lesion Groups ANOVA) (see 
Figure 3). There was no signiﬁ  cant difference between performance on 
the ﬁ  rst and second blocks in either single task condition.
Switch task conditions. Two complementary 4-way ANOVAs were   carried 
out which involved Patient Group as a between-subject factor and as within-
subject factors Cue Type (Long, Short), Trial Type (Repeat, Switch) and 
Block (First, Second). The ﬁ  rst of these was a split-plot ANOVA comparing 
the four patient groups with the controls; it was followed by a secondary 
ANOVA comparing any critical patient group with the other patient groups 
combined. Again only one patient group behaved differently from the other 
patient groups and the controls – the SM group (Basic Groups ANOVA – SM v 
CTLs: F(1,74) = 24.17, p < 0.001; Within Lesion Groups ANOVA – SM v Other 
Patient Groups: F(1,39) = 19.16; p < 0.001) (see Figure 4). This group was 
far slower than any other – 948 ms slower than the CTL group in the Long 
Cue condition and 1250 ms slower in the Short Cue condition. The effect of 
Cue Type was signiﬁ  cant (Basic Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 34.33, p < 0.001); 
with subjects being faster in the Long Cue condition than in the Short Cue 
one. The SM group showed an increased slowing in the Short Cue condi-
tion compared to both the Controls (Basic Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 15.24, 
p <  0.001) and the Other Patient Groups (Within Lesion Groups ANOVA 
– F(1,39) = 9.33, p < 0.005). The effect of Block was not signiﬁ  cant for any 
patient group, and no interaction involving this factor was signiﬁ  cant. There 
was, however, an overall effect of Trial Type with Switch trials being slower 
than Repeat ones (Basic Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 13.04, p < 0.002). In 
addition there was a signiﬁ  cant interaction between Group and Trial Type; 
again the SM group behaved differently showing a greater switch cost com-
pared to the Controls (Basic Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 21.38, p < 0.001) 
and to Other Patient Groups (Within Lesion Groups ANOVA – F(1,39) = 16.17, 
p < 0.001). Thus for the Long Cue condition, the switch cost in the SM group 
was 433 ms by comparison with 128 ms in the CTL Group and from 59 to 
113 ms in the other Patient Groups. In the Short Cue condition the switch cost 
for the SM group was 412 ms compared to that of 115 ms for the CTLs and 
35–150 ms for the other patient groups. The other patient groups, including 
the LL one, showed no sign of an abnormally large switch cost.
Table 2.  Subject demographic and neuropsychological test data.
   CTL  LL   RL   IM   SM 
Number (female/total)   22/38  3/11   2/6   5/14   5/10 
Age (years)   49 ± 16   43 ± 12   47 ± 13   46 ± 16   48 ± 15 
Education (years)   15 ± 2   13 ± 2*   16 ± 2   14 ± 2   13.5 ± 2* 
NART-R   112 ± 7   104 ± 9*   113 ± 10   107 ± 8   104 ± 12 
Digit span   7.1 ± 1.5   6.3 ± 0.9   6.3 ± 1.4   6.4 ± 1.3   6.7 ± 1.6 
Boston naming test   55 ± 4   53 ± 4   57 ± 3   53 ± 9   52 ± 4 
Beck depression inventory   6.1 ± 5.9   9.1 ± 7.9   11.3 ± 11.7   8.63 ± 9.3   8.4 ± 9.7 
Lesion size (% brain)     1.1 ± 0.9   2.0 ± 1.5   2.3 ± 1.5   4.7 ± 3.9 
Time since injury (month)     21 ± 26   13 ± 10   32 ± 32   23 ± 16
Means ± standard deviations for all data except the numbers of subjects. NART-R is National Adult Reading Test Revised. Signiﬁ  cant Asterisks show 
differences from CTL.
Stimuli
Correct
Responses
Trial Type
Left or Right?
Congruent
Left or Right?
Congruent
Up or Down?
Repeat
Congruent
Up or Down?
Switch Switch
Incongruent
Time
Figure 2.  Stimulus paradigm. Correct responses and trial-types for three 
successive trials of one of the two cued conditions.
Table 1.  Continued
Subject  Etiology   Lesion location*  Lesion size (%)**  TSI (months)   Handedness
2194  Infarction/SAH  Polar (L & R), inferior medial (L & R),  3.2  20  Right
    superior medial (L & R)
2199  Hemorrhage  Dorsolateral (R), superior medial (R)  2.1  28  Ambi
2209  Meningioma resection   Corpus callosum (R), superior medial (R)  1.8  10   Right 
     4.7 23
   Mean of all groups  2.5  122.6 
SAH: intracerbral lesion due to ruptured aneurysm.
*Only areas of maximum pathology are identiﬁ  ed.
**Percent of whole brain.
***Scan lost after initial classiﬁ  cation.Shallice et al.
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In a subsidiary analysis, the effect of the congruency of the   stimulus-
response mapping was examined (see Figure 5). Two complementary 
4-way ANOVAs were carried out with three within-subject factors Cue 
Type (Long, Short), Trial Type (Switch, Repeat) and Congruency and 
one between-subject factor, Group. There was a signiﬁ   cant effect of 
congruency (Basic Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 7.10, p,0.01), with the 
  incongruent stimulus eliciting the longer RT. There was also a strong 
trend for an interaction with congruency for the SM group by comparison 
both with respect to the CTLs (Basic Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 3.56, 
p = 0.06) and with respect to the Other Patient Groups (Within Lesion 
Groups ANOVA – F(1,39) = 3.81, p = 0.06). The responding of the SM 
group appeared to be slowed more than that of the other groups by hav-
ing incongruent rather than congruent stimuli.
Speciﬁ  c tasks. Two complementary 4-way ANOVAs were carried out to 
investigate the effect of the speciﬁ  c task, and in particular whether the 
decision involved the vertical or horizontal dimension of stimulus position 
(Task Direction), the other three factors being Group, Trial Type (Switch, 
Repeat) and Condition (Short Cue, Long Cue). As well as the effects of 
group and trial type expected from the preceding ANOVAs, there was a sig-
niﬁ  cant effect of Task Direction, vertical being harder than horizontal (Basic 
Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 10.412, p = 0.002) (see Figure 6). More criti-
cally, there was a signiﬁ  cant interaction involving Task Direction and group 
where the SM group was concerned (Basic Groups ANOVA – SM v CTLs: 
F(1,74) = 11.05, p < 0.002; Within Lesion Groups ANOVA – SM v Other 
Patient Groups: F(1,39) = 6.12, p < 0.02). The SM group slowed more 
when faced with the more difﬁ  cult vertical task.
Ratio of switch cost to base reaction time. Given that the SM group 
shows a much greater switch cost but is also much slower overall, the 
issue arises as to whether its switch cost was disproportionately greater 
than would be expected given the overall slower reaction time. Two com-
plementary 2-way ANOVAs comparing Cue type (Long, Short) and Group 
were carried out on the measure switch cost/mean RT for the condition 
(ratio switch cost RT). With this ratio measure there was no longer a sig-
niﬁ  cant effect for the SM group (Basic Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 1.89, 
p = 0.17). There was however a signiﬁ  cant effect for the IM group which 
had a signiﬁ  cantly smaller ratio switch cost RT than both the controls 
(Basic Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 4.52, p < 0.05) and the Other Lesion 
groups (Within Lesion Groups ANOVA – F(1,39) = 8.45, p < 0.01).
‘Mixed list cost’: the cost of having two tasks active. If one contrasts 
performance in the single task conditions with that in the repeat trials of 
the switch task conditions then one has a measure which relates to the 
cost of having two tasks active rather than one (see Meiran et al., 2000). 
When the patient groups are compared with the controls on this measure 
Figure 3.  Single task conditions. Mean reaction times and standard errors 
for the four patient groups and the controls on the two tasks (horizontal and 
vertical).
Figure 4. Switch vs. Repeat. Mean reaction times and standard errors for 
the four patient groups and the controls on Repeat and Switch trials in the 
Long Cue and Short Cue task conditions.
Figure 5.  Effects of congruency. Mean reaction times and standard errors 
for the four patient groups and the controls on Congruent and Incongruent 
trials in the Long Cue and Short Cue task conditions.
Figure 6.  Horizontal vs. vertical. Mean reaction times and standard errors 
for the four patient groups and the controls on Horizontal and Vertical trials in 
the Long Cue and Short Cue task conditions.Prefrontal cortex and task-switching
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there is still a strong and signiﬁ  cant deﬁ  cit in the SM group (Basic Groups 
ANOVA – F(1,74) = 27.12, p < 0.001).
Errors
Single task conditions. There were no signiﬁ  cant differences across 
groups or tasks in the error rates, which were minimal.
Switch task conditions. In all groups virtually all the errors occur on 
incongruent trials. As for the reaction times two complementary 4-way 
ANOVAs were carried out with factors Cue Type (Long, Short), Trial Type 
(Switch, Repeat), Block (1st, 2nd) and Group. Overall there was an effect 
of Trial Type (Basic Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 6.28; p = 0.014) with 
more errors on switch trials, but no interaction of this factor with patient 
group. There was no effect of Block or interactions with this factor. The IM 
group made signiﬁ  cantly more errors than the CTL group (Basic Groups 
ANOVA – F(1, 74) = 8.39, p < 0.01). Thus in the Long Cue condition IM 
groups made over ﬁ  ve times the number of errors as the CTL group and 
in the Short Cue condition over three times as many (see Figure 7). The 
IM group, however, did not produce signiﬁ  cantly more errors than the 
Other Patient groups combined in the Within Lesion Groups ANOVA, in 
part because the SM group showed a strong trend to produce more errors 
than the CTL group (Basic Groups ANOVA – F(1,74) = 3.45, p = 0.07).
Surprisingly there were no signiﬁ  cant effects of Cue Type or Trial Type. 
However, there was a second effect which concerned the LL group. There 
were signiﬁ  cant interactions between Block (ﬁ  rst and second) and patient 
group (Basic Groups ANOVA – LL v CTLs: F(1,74) = 5.02, p < 0.05). The 
interaction arises from the LL group producing signiﬁ  cantly more errors 
on the ﬁ  rst Task Block of a cue type than on the second such Block (see 
Figure 8). The effect is particularly pronounced on the Short Cue Task, 
where the effect was signiﬁ  cant at the 0.01 level; it should be noted that 
the two Short Cue Task Blocks are separated by two intervening blocks 
involving the Long Cue Task condition. The improvement occurring in the 
LL group can be seen by the way in which on the ﬁ  rst Short Cue Task 
block, the LL group had a virtually identical error rate to the IM group, but 
on the second such block, IM patients had about four times as high an 
error rate as the LL group.
In a subsidiary analysis the error switch cost was compared across 
the two Long and Short Cue conditions; there was a signiﬁ  cantly greater 
switch cost in the Long Cue than in the Short Cue condition when all 
subjects were considered [Wilcoxon n = 58, t = 474, p < 0.005 (2 tail)], 
when patients alone were considered [Wilcoxon n = 30,  t = 105.5, 
p < 0.01 (2 tail)] but not when controls alone were considered (Wilcoxon 
n = 28; t = 137, p > 0.1).
More detailed anatomy: the errors induced by having two tasks 
active. The effect on RT of SM lesions was similar to effects found in 
other studies (see Stuss and Alexander, 2007; Stuss et al., 2005). This 
was not the case for the error patterns, where increased error rates 
were found in the IM group with only a trend in the SM groups on the 
Basic Groups ANOVA. On the more detailed analysis of the combined 
errors induced by having two tasks active, patients with lesions in left 
areas 9m, 11o, 14m and 47/12o made more errors at the 0.05 level 
than patients whose lesions did not involve this area and with patients 
with lesions in left areas 10i, 10o, 14o, 47/12o and right area 47/12v 
making signiﬁ  cantly more errors at the 0.1 level than patients whose 
lesions did not involve the respective speciﬁ  c areas. (see Figure 9). No 
other detailed analysis of error patterns produced signiﬁ  cant effects at 
the 0.05 level.
In the basic group analysis, there was a signiﬁ  cant decrease in the 
number of errors that occurred between the ﬁ  rst and second blocks of 
each condition. For the anatomically more detailed analysis, the measure 
used was of:
1st Block Errors − 2nd Block Errors
for the Long Cue and Short Cue Task conditions combined. For each 
region whether there was a signiﬁ  cant difference between the patients 
producing high and low scores on this measure was assessed. Regions 
left 9/46v and right 6A gave signiﬁ  cant effects at the 0.1 level. If one 
restricts consideration to the Short Cue condition alone, which cor-
responds to assessing the difference between the ﬁ  rst and last blocks 
of the set of four switching conditions, then a signiﬁ  cant difference at 
the 0.05 level in favour of high scores was found in the left dorsolateral 
region (9/46v) only.
DISCUSSION
Nearly all previous studies of task-switching carried out with frontal lobe 
patients have involved small patient samples so it is not possible to draw 
strong conclusions about the localisation of any relevant processes within 
the frontal cortex. The major exception is the study of Aron et al. (2004) 
in which 36 patients with lesions to frontal cortex were assessed. In the 
Aron et al., study, a variant of the so-called ‘alternating runs’ procedure 
developed by Rogers and Monsell (1995) was used in which the speciﬁ  c 
task that is relevant on each trial can be predicted in advance. The cur-
rent investigation with 41 patients is the second study with a sufﬁ  ciently 
Figure 7.  Error rates. Mean error rates (with standard errors of the mean) 
of the four patient groups and the controls on Repeat and Switch trials in the 
Long Cue and Short Cue task conditions.
Figure 8. Errors over time. Mean error rates (with standard errors of the 
mean) of the four patient groups and the controls on the ﬁ  rst and second 
blocks of the Long Cue and Short Cue task conditions. The results are   plotted 
from left to right in the order that the blocks occurred during the session – 
Short Cue, Long Cue, Long Cue, Short Cue.Shallice et al.
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large patient sample to investigate localisation of processes within frontal 
cortex. However, a paradigm relating to one developed by Meiran (1996) 
was employed in which the only information the subject has as to which 
task is relevant on a given trial comes from the immediately preced-
ing cue. Three different regions of prefrontal cortex produce impairments 
with respect to at least one aspect of task-switching. What is most strik-
ing is the difference in the pattern of results compared with those of the 
Aron et al., study. The contrast in results serves to underline the complex-
ity of the processes underlying task-switching and the sensitivity of the 
results to speciﬁ  c aspects of the experimental paradigm. It also points 
to the possible importance of methods of grouping neuropsychological 
patients.
In the current study three of the four frontal groups – LL, RL and 
IM – were virtually identical to the CTL group on basic RT and on switch 
costs in all conditions. By contrast, there was a large and signiﬁ  cant 
slowing of basic RT in the SM group. The SM group was roughly 50% 
slower than the CTL group in the Single Task condition – a difference of 
252 ms. However it had an overall RT roughly double the basic RT of the 
CTLs in both the Long Cue and Short Cue conditions, with a slowing of 
948 and 1250 ms, respectively. Moreover the switch cost was 433 ms 
and 412 ms in the Long and Short Cue conditions, respectively, compared 
to 128 and 115 ms in the CTL group. In the Aron et al., study, there were 
only marginal differences from the current study in the length of their 
Short and Long Cue intervals. Yet switch cost was principally increased 
in the Left Frontal group together with the Right Frontal group in the Long 
Cue condition. Turning to errors, the current study gave abnormal effects 
in the IM, the SM and the LL groups while the Aron et al., study found a 
Right Frontal effect.
Why might these differences exist? One possibility is that the cur-
rent grouping procedure, which used four frontal groups and did not 
restrict patient selection to those with unilateral lesions, might give 
more   speciﬁ  c basic group localisations than the Aron et al., study which 
Figure 9.  Relation of errors to lesions. Location of lesions with respect to the increased rate of errors in the Long Cue and Short Cue conditions combined. The 
ﬁ  gure shows regions where the error switch cost is largest. The dark grey shading indicates a region where the effect is signiﬁ  cant at the 0.05 level or better, 
with the light grey representing the 0.1 level. The diagrams of the orbital regions are placed so as to facilitate comparisons with the corresponding diagrams 
of the lateral and medial surfaces.Prefrontal cortex and task-switching
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  initially just differentiated between Left and Right Frontal groups and 
used only unilateral lesion patients. This might provide a partial expla-
nation, as the critical SM group which provided such strong RT and 
switch-cost effects in the current study, involved 2 unilateral left, 6 
unilateral right and 3 bilateral patients and would not have shown up 
as a distinct group in the Aron study. However, to use this as an argu-
ment for equivalence across studies would be weak, as in the Aron 
et al., study, the medial part of the lesions were much smaller than 
the lateral parts in the Left Frontal group; this makes it implausible 
to attribute the impairments of the LL group in the Aron et al., study 
to the medial part of the lesions. So taking a localisation-of-function 
perspective, the effects found with this group in the current study seem 
unlikely to derive from the same process as that producing the strongly 
signiﬁ  cant Left Frontal effect on switch costs found by Aron et al., in 
their Short Cue condition.
A more likely source of the difference in pattern between the two sets 
of results lies in a key behavioural difference between the way the two 
paradigms are carried out. In the study of Aron et al., there was a con-
siderable reduction in switch costs in their Long Cue condition (1500 ms 
between cue and stimulus) compared with their Short Cue (100 ms) con-
dition. In the current study the preparation which the Long Cue condition 
allows leads to a large reduction in reaction time for all groups, com-
pared with how they perform in the Short Cue condition. This decrease is 
287 ms for the CTL group and 613 ms for the SM group. However, there 
was no substantial change in the switch cost between the Long Cue and 
Short Cue conditions for any of the groups. Yet participants have 1500 ms 
to prepare the appropriate task-set in the Long Cue condition, but only 
200 ms in the Short Cue one.
The reduction of switch costs with an increased cue-stimulus interval 
found in the Aron et al., study is the more typical ﬁ  nding in the litera-
ture (see e.g., Monsell, 2003). However, no reduction in switch cost with 
increased preparation time has also been found in a number of other 
studies (e.g., Altmann, 2004; Dreisbach et al., 2002; Sohn and Carlson, 
1998). Indeed, Meiran and Gotler (2001) have argued that older sub-
jects, who are well represented in the current study, when compared 
to younger ones who are the typical participants in most task switching 
studies, show much bigger switch costs and residual costs (Long Cue 
vs. Single Task condition) but preparation costs (Short Cue vs. Long Cue) 
are not increased. Thus preparation effects would, relatively speaking, be 
smaller in subjects such as those in our sample.
This lack of an effect on switch costs of the length of time subjects 
have to prepare is unlikely to be because subjects just ignore the verbal 
task speciﬁ  cation (e.g., Left or Right?) in the 1500 ms of the Long Cue 
interval. A correct Repeat response in that condition for most groups is 
taking little more than 200 ms longer than in the Single Task condition, 
so to process and organise a response to the cue in that time instead of 
also using the preceding 1500 ms seems most implausible. Moreover, in 
another task-switching paradigm, Monsell and Mizon (2006) found word 
cues more effective than picture cues. Also it seems unlikely that subjects 
are still in the process of acquiring the appropriate procedure to interpret 
the cue indicating the task-set (see Logan and Bundesen, 2003; Monsell, 
2003). In the present study the main effect of Block, and its interactions 
with lesion group were all far from signiﬁ  cant as far as reaction time 
was concerned, which does not suggest that the subjects in most groups 
were changing strategy over the course of the experiment. Instead a pos-
sible factor in the present paradigm is that we roughly equalised the rate 
of responding in the two conditions by having different response-to-cue 
intervals (Short Cue 3000 ms, Long Cue 1500 ms). A response-to-cue 
interval of 3 second has been found to reduce switch costs, possibly by 
allowing task set to dissipate (Meiran et al., 2000, but see Altmann, 2005). 
Another way to explain the pattern is to use an approach associated with 
De Jong (2000), in terms of the subjects in our study, by comparison 
with typical young student subjects, being less willing to actively use the 
preparation interval to attend to a speciﬁ  c dimension. Indeed blocked 
presentation, as used in our study, might have encouraged subjects to 
prepare when to respond rather than how to respond (see Altmann, 2005; 
Meiran et al., 2000 for related discussions).
Support for this hypothesis can be found in the nature of the errors. In 
the Short Cue condition they occur almost equally on Switch and Repeat 
trials; subjects do not show a switch cost in errors; on the Long Cue 
condition, however, there are roughly double the number on Switch than 
Repeat trials. The difference in the error switch-cost between the Short 
and Long Cue conditions is highly signiﬁ  cant and opposite to that to be 
expected if task-set reconﬁ  guration is occurring during the preparation 
interval. By contrast the control group in Aron et al.’s study show the 
more typical reductions in the switch cost both for reaction time and 
errors in going from the Short to Long cue interval. There would therefore 
appear to be considerable differences in the strategies used by the sub-
jects in the two studies. Direct comparisons of the localisation of particu-
lar behavioural effects between the two studies are therefore probably 
not useful.
It would appear that in this particular version of switch task the proc-
ess of selecting a different task-set tends to occur only when the stimulus 
arrives, even in the Long Cue condition. The cue may instead act as a 
general warning signal speeding up processes other than the selection 
of the task-set and particularly facilitating responding on the repeat tri-
als. So the error rate falls on repeat trials relative to switch ones. On this 
perspective how should one interpret the effects found in lesion groups? 
We will consider the SM, IM and LL groups in turn.
The superior medial group
There was a highly selective slowing in the SM group across both condi-
tions and an increase in errors which was signiﬁ  cant in the Long Cue 
condition. The increase in RT reproduced effects found in a number of 
previous studies of RT paradigms (Alexander et al., 2005; Stuss and 
Alexander, 2007; Stuss et al., 2002b, 2005). It needs further investiga-
tion to determine whether the disproportionate increase in the theoreti-
cally critical switch cost measure found in the SM group has the same 
cause as the selective slowing seen in earlier simpler reaction time stud-
ies. The possibility that the cause is the same, arises because for RTs, 
switch cost is signiﬁ  cantly lengthened only in the SM group and not in 
any other frontal group. Moreover, the magnitude of the slowing of reac-
tion time in the SM group by comparison with, say, the CTL group was 
also affected by other variables. For instance, it was greater if the deci-
sion required the generally harder (vertical) – than the generally easier 
(horizontal) – dimension. Presumably, the vertical decision was harder, 
because in the horizontal case the mapping of response to stimulus (such 
as left stimulus requiring a left response) is highly compatible and in the 
vertical decision this mapping would have to be inhibited. A similar effect 
was found for incongruency; incongruency cost was greater for the SM 
group at least by comparison with the CTL group. This group slowed sig-
niﬁ  cantly more than the others in moving from the Long Cue to the Short 
Cue condition. Most critically, when an analysis was carried out across 
groups on the measure of the ratio of Switch Cost/Mean RT, this was lit-
tle higher in the SM group than in other groups, with the effect being far 
from signiﬁ  cant.
These ﬁ  ndings could be related to phenomena observed in an earlier 
reaction time study (Stuss et al., 2005). In that study when a warning signal 
occurs a ﬁ  xed length of time before a stimulus for a block of trials, reaction 
times are slower if the foreperiod lasts 3 seconds rather than 1 second; this 
slowing with longer foreperiods, just like the basic reaction time, is signiﬁ  -
cantly greater in the SM group than in the other frontal patients or the CTLs. 
Turning to errors, those the group make appear to reﬂ  ect a related process; 
the three subjects in the group who made most errors in the experiment 
– 37, 14 and 6, respectively – were the slowest patients of all with average 
RTs of 4.5, 4.6 and 2.7 seconds, respectively.
The greater switch cost in the SM group may therefore arise 
from some impairment or impairments that affect many other situ-
ations involving RT measures. Given the localisation it could result 
from an impairment in ‘energising’, the processes held to be required Shallice et al.
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whenever the computation of which response should be produced is 
not solely a result of standard triggering of well-learned schemata 
in contention scheduling on the Norman-Shallice model (Stuss and 
Alexander, 2007; Stuss et al., 1995, 2005). One possibility is that any 
type of difficulty encountered by an organism leads to top-down acti-
vation of a system located in the SM region which in turn leads to an 
energising of task-relevant cortical processes, possibly by means of a 
circuit involving anterior cingulate ≥ locus coeruleus ≥ noradrenergic 
system (Mottaghy et al., 2006; Sturm et al., 1999) Thus, on an inter-
active activation model of task-switching, such as that of Gilbert and 
Shallice (2002), the amount by which the activation levels of action 
schema units are increased as a result of a given input to a unit 
would be reduced. In this case the lengthening of the switch cost in 
the SM group would not imply that switching is directly mediated by 
the region; one could not for instance infer that endogenous control 
(or task-set reconfiguration) is a process carried out in the SM region. 
This conclusion fits with the perspective derived from certain neu-
roimaging studies where the same frontal network was found to be 
involved on both switch and repeat trials (e.g., Brass and von Cramon, 
2004; Dove et al., 2000; Ruge et al., 2005; and in older subjects 
DiGirolamo et al., 2001).
There is a second type of conclusion that one can draw from these 
lines of argument. Any ﬁ  nding of an increase of RT switch cost in a fron-
tal group which contains patients with medial frontal lesions, and where 
no consideration is made of whether any lengthening of basic RT has 
occurred, would be easy to misinterpret. It may merely reﬂ  ect an unspe-
ciﬁ  c effect of the greater difﬁ  culty of the switch condition.
An alternative explanation of the SM group’s greater switch costs 
which cannot be ruled out is that they arise from damage to speciﬁ  c 
regions within the superior medial region that have a more special role 
in task-switching. One such possibility derives from the way that task 
switching paradigms entail the activation of two conﬂ  icting task-sets 
during a block of trials. Thus two task-sets are primed and conﬂ  icting 
responses will in turn be activated. SM structures, more speciﬁ  cally the 
anterior cingulate, have been extensively discussed in the context of the 
monitoring of response conﬂ  ict (e.g., Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al., 
1998). Loss of these monitoring functions might be expected to lead both 
to a particular slowing in the switch condition compared to single task 
conditions, and this is indeed found, and also to an increase in errors, and 
there is a near-signiﬁ  cant trend for such an increase. A second possibility 
derives from Walton et al.’s (2004) suggestion that certain regions of the 
superior medial region, in particular the pre-SMA, may play a speciﬁ  c role 
in a process related to task-switching, In particular they held it to relate 
to voluntary selection between response sets, where this corresponds 
to the association between a relevant task dimension (e.g., colour) and 
the speciﬁ  c response. A third possibility would relate to the involvement 
of regions held to be responsible for holding a task-set for later execu-
tion, proposed to be more anteriorly located on the medial surface (e.g., 
Haynes et al., 2007). Unfortunately the lesions of the SM group were 
insufﬁ  ciently focal within the medial surfaces to determine whether the 
pre-SMA, the anterior cingulate or indeed yet more anterior structures 
were playing a critical role.
The higher error rates in the inferior medial group
The IM group had a signiﬁ  cantly higher overall error rate than the CTLs in 
the combined Long Cue and the Short Cue conditions.. The more speciﬁ  c 
anatomical analysis pointed to left areas 11o, 14m and 47/12o in addi-
tion to left area 9s, as showing a higher rate of errors at the 0.05 level 
or more. In imaging studies, it has been shown that a variety of regions 
of IM prefrontal cortex are activated when the amount of gain or loss is 
manipulated when making a correct or an error response (e.g., Taylor 
et al., 2006). Moreover, patients with orbital lesions show much higher 
error rates in memory tasks where category cues are used (Turner et al., 
2007). IM lesions might therefore be expected to lead to a reduction in 
the implicit cost to the subject in making an error (see e.g., Rolls, 2004). 
The subject cares less. Task switching is a highly attention-demanding 
task where any lapsing into an automatic mode of responding is liable to 
lead to an error particularly on a switch trial, so a reduction in the implicit 
cost of making an error is likely to lead to an increase in their occurrence. 
At the same time such a tendency to move to a more automatic mode of 
responding would be expected to lead to a reduction in switch costs; this 
indeed occurs in the IM group.
The left lateral effect on errors
Even though there were no differences in the performance of the LL 
group and that of the CTL Group on reaction times, there was a LL 
effect on errors in our study. The LL group showed a signiﬁ  cantly 
greater number of errors than the controls in the ﬁ  rst block of each 
condition they carried out by comparison with the second block, which 
involved precisely the same condition. Thus they were as bad as the 
worst other frontal group – the IM group – on the very ﬁ  rst block and 
yet were almost identical to the CTL Group on the very last one. A simi-
lar effect of a greater number of errors on their blocks 1 and 2 in Left 
Frontal patients by comparison with CTL subjects and Right Frontal 
patients appears as a 0.07 trend in the results of the task-switching 
study of Rogers et al. (1998), which had considerably fewer patients. 
In the current study the more detailed anatomical analysis pointed to 
left area 9/46v.
These effects can be explained in terms of the involvement of the 
LL region in a process which Stuss et al. (1995) called ‘task-setting’. In 
task-switching a complex set of action-schemas must ﬁ  rst be speciﬁ  ed 
so that they can be explicitly realised; the simplest possible set we have 
been able to produce for the current paradigm is given in Appendix 1. 
This process of action schema-speciﬁ  cation was called the use of If–
Then logic in Stuss et al. (1995). When this has been done, the set of 
new (perceptual) trigger ≥ (action) schema pairs, must begin to be more 
automated, in the sense that the production of the schema output given 
that the input conditions are satisﬁ  ed would come to no longer require 
conscious inferences or explicit retrieval from episodic memory. (This is 
equivalent to its being laid down in contention scheduling on the Norman-
Shallice model). In addition to the forming of these new trigger-schema 
pairs and making their operation ﬂ  uent, the schemas need to be modu-
lated in the learning period; for instance, over how long the inhibition 
operates in the last two of the schemas listed above. Determination of the 
length of the period is itself a complex process considered in the previous 
section of the Discussion.
The group which was slow to learn to automate these newly required 
schemas was the LL group. In the ﬁ  rst block they made a high num-
bers of errors in the difﬁ  cult Short Cue condition. However, the perform-
ance of the group became essentially normal after the initial block was 
completed. In an earlier ﬁ  ve-choice serial reaction time task (Alexander 
et al., 2005), patients with LL lesions showed a similar effect. They per-
formed completely comparably with controls with respect to both reac-
tion time and errors after the ﬁ  rst hundred trials, but they had a much 
higher error rate on the ﬁ  rst hundred trials. Thus, in a quite different type 
of reaction time test, one has a parallel result to that in the Alexander 
et al., study and so converging evidence for the involvement of the left 
lateral prefrontal cortex in task-setting. This position is also compat-
ible with the perspective of Brass and von Cramon (2004) derived from 
related functional imaging experiments in which they found activation 
of the left inferior frontal gyrus. The difﬁ  culty the LL group have is very 
broadly in accord with problems for left frontal patients found in other 
smaller studies of task-switching (Keele and Rafal, 2000; Mecklinger 
et al., 1999; Rogers et al., 1998; Stablum et al., 1994). In particular, the 
account given has a conceptual similarity and ﬁ  ts very well anatomically 
with the interpretation given by Aron et al., for the left frontal effects 
they found and which they associated with the left middle frontal gyrus 
in their very different task-switching paradigm, namely that left frontal 
lesions led to weaker endogenous control of task-set (see also Garavan 
et al., 2002).Prefrontal cortex and task-switching
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CONCLUSIONS
Overall the current study supports the position that many different pre-
frontal processes affect the performance of task-set switching. In addition 
the study provides converging evidence with a number of other studies 
(see Stuss and Alexander, 2007) concerning two of these different prefron-
tal processes. The ﬁ  rst such process is the basic energising process which 
we hold to be required when behaviour cannot just be left to the con-
trol of the more automatic contention scheduling processes. Energising 
appears to be involved in all reaction time tasks but it would be expected 
to become increasingly critical as the processes involved in the stimu-
lus–response mapping become more complex. Energising is impaired 
by superior medial prefrontal lesions and the impairment in this group is 
greater the more complex the stimulus–response mapping. Whether this 
explanation for the SM group’s performance is to be preferred to, or indeed 
is compatible with, the alternative of a loss of the capacity for monitoring 
response conﬂ  ict, remains to be investigated.
A second set of processes, which are required in task-switching, come 
into play when the block involves competing tasks, each of which can 
operate on the stimuli presented. Such a situation predisposes the par-
ticipant to make a capture error in which the wrong task-set controls the 
response output. Inferior medial lesions lead to higher error rates in both 
the Long Cue and Short Cue situations. These could possibly be explained 
in terms of a failure to maintain a sufﬁ  ciently high criterion to catch poten-
tial errors, due to the loss in implicit cost in producing errors.
Finally a third prefrontal region – the left lateral one – is involved 
in the early stages of learning the task. A similar ﬁ  nding was obtained 
for performance on the ﬁ  rst 100 trials of a 5-choice serial reaction time 
study (Alexander et  al., 2005). We consider the process impaired to 
involve ‘task-setting’ (Stuss et al., 1995), the process involved in setting 
the stimulus–response contingencies which will control routine behav-
iour later in task execution. A related position was advocated by Aron 
et al., to explain somewhat different phenomena related to left frontal 
lesions in their task-switching paradigm. Overall it is clear, as proposed in 
Stuss et al. (1995) that there are a variety of processes involved in atten-
tional tasks which are carried out in different regions of prefrontal cortex. 
Moreover the task-switching paradigm, far from being a   process-pure 
procedure, involves at least three and very likely more anterior attentional 
processes.
APPENDIX
In the current experiment, a set of schemas at least as complex as the fol-
lowing ones must be set up by the cognitive system in order to carry out 
the Meiran task-switching paradigm (an IF/THEN notation is used where 
the left-hand (IF) side corresponds to both (1) the output of the perceptual 
system and (2) the equivalent of the contents of a production system 
working memory (WM), and the right-hand (THEN) side corresponds to 
operations, with the contents of brackets referring to ‘arguments’ (i.e., 
the variables that are set):
1.  IF Cue THEN read text
2.  IF Stimulus present and text ‘upper or lower’ THEN attend (vertical) 
in WM
3.  IF Stimulus present and text ‘left or right’ THEN attend (horizontal) 
in WM
4.  IF attend (vertical) is in WM and Square is high THEN press button (L)
5.  IF attend (vertical) is in WM and Square is low THEN press button (R)
6.  IF attend (horizontal) is in WM and Square is left THEN press button (L)
7.  IF attend (horizontal) is in WM and Square is right THEN press button (R)
8.  IF instruction (Long Cue condition) THEN Inhibit outputs of schemas 
(4, 5, 6, 7) but only until a short time after stimulus onset)
9.  IF instruction (Short Cue condition) THEN Inhibit outputs of schemas 
(4, 5, 6, 7) but for a longer period after stimulus onset)
Some process similar to schemas 8 and 9 is required to overcome the 
effects on schemas 4–7 of task-set inertia (i.e., the continuing activation 
of schemas from the previous trial). The most difﬁ  cult condition, which 
is the Short Cue one, must rely heavily on schema 9 to overcome these 
priming effects.
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